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One Year Review of Colorado Law -1964
I. CIVIL PROCEDURE
A. RIGHT To JURY TRIAL FOR LEGAL COUNTERCLAIM AGAINST
EQUITABLE CLAIM
In Miller v. District Court,' the Colorado Supreme Court bucked
the trend of federal and state court decisions regarding the right
to a jury trial in civil suits. In this case, the plaintiff alleged that
defendants had defaulted on a promissory note secured by a mort-
gage deed, and demanded foreclosure by sale of the mortgaged
property. Defendants answered by alleging fraud in the procure-
ment of the note and mortgage and filed a counterclaim for the
alleged breach of contract involving the transaction in which the
note and mortgage were executed. Defendants demanded trial by
jury pursuant to Rule 38(b), Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure.'
Ten days prior to the trial, the defendants were informed by the
district court that it had granted the plaintiff's motion to strike the
case from the jury calendar and had ordered that the action be tried
by the court without a jury.
The defendants, petitioners in mandamus, contended that Rule
38(a) 3 established in them a right to trial by jury. The supreme
court affirmed the lower court's action. Referring to Rule 38(a),
the court, Moore, J., said:
This rule, in all material parts, adopts without change the
provisions of Rule 191 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This code
provision has been construed on numerous occasions by this court
prior to the adoption of Rule 38(a). The promulgation of the new
rule, the pertinent parts of which are in the exact language of the
pre-existing code, necessarily included the construction theretofore
given the language of the code provisions. The new rule of civil
procedure did not enlarge upon the right to the jury trial as those
rights were fixed by the code provision and the judicial pronounce-
ments thereunder. No other rule of civil procedure enlarges the
category of cases in which the right to jury trial shall be had.4
The court cited several Colorado cases which interpreted the
code to mean that the determination of whether or not an issue of
fact must be tried by a jury was dependent upon the character of
1 Miller v. District Court, 388 P.2d 763 (Colo. 1964).
2 Rule 38(b) provides: "Any party may demand a trial by jury of any issue triable by
a jury by serving upon the other parties a demand therefor in writing at any time
after the commencement of the action and not later than 10 days after the service of
the last pleading directed to such issue. Such demand may be indorsed upon a plead-
ing of the party."
3 Rule 38(a) provides: "Upon demand, in actions for the recovery of specific real or
personal property, with or without damages, or for money claimed as due on contract,
or as damages for breach of contract, or for injuries to person or property, an issue
of fact must be tried by a jury, unless a jury trial is thereafter waived."
4 Miller v. District Court, 388 P.2d 763, 765 (Colo. 1964).
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the action in which the issue was joined.5 Here the mortgage
foreclosure, an equitable claim, was held to have invoked the equity
aim of the court and the character of the action thereby determined.
The effect of the court's interpretation of the code, and thus
of Rule 38(a), is disadvantageous to a defendant. If a defendant
interposes a counterclaim in an equitable action, as determined by
the plaintiff's claim, he waives any right to a jury trial he may
otherwise have had (in a separate action) on issues presented by
the counterclaim.' Generally, permissive counterclaims allowed by
Rule 13 (b) will not involve issues of fact raised by the basic claim,
so a separate trial of these claims may not create any disadvantage
other than the economics of litigation.7 As the petitioners argue
in their brief, to insure a right to a jury trial on the legal question
a premium is placed on the race to the court house to file the claim,
thereby permanently fixing the character of the action.
Compulsory counterclaims to an equitable claim present an
entirely different problem Federal Rule 13 (a) has been interpreted
to mean that a defendant must assert those counterclaims arising
from the same transaction or occurrence as the subject of the plain-
tiff's claim or relinquish them.9 One authority goes so far as to say
that a rule which attaches the consequences of a waiver to the inter-
position of a compulsory counterclaim would probably be uncon-
stitutional."0
5 Tiger Placers Co. v. Fisher, 98 Colo. 221, 54 P.2d 891 (1936) ; Rosenbaum v. Buch-
hert, 73 Colo. 260, 215 Pac. 131 (1923) ; Plain Iron Works Co. v. Haggott, 72
Colo. 228, 210 Pac. 696 (1922) ; Neikirk v. Boulder National Bank, 53 Colo. 350.
127 Pac. 137 (1912) ; Selfridge v. Leonard-Heffner Co., 51 Colo. 314, 117 Pac. 158
(1911); Cree v. Lewis, 49 Colo. 186, 112 Pac. 326 (1910); United Coal Co. v.
[Canon City] Coal Co., 24 Colo. 116, 48 Pac. 1045 (1897); Danielson v. Gude,
11 Colo. 87, 17 Pac. 283 (1888).
6 James, Right to a jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655, 684 (1963).
7 McCoid, jury Trials in Federal Courts, 45 IowA L. REV. 726, 736 (1960).
8 CoLo. R. Civ. P. 13 - Counterclaim and cross-claim
(a) Compulsory Counterclaims. A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim
at the time of filing the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party,
if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the
opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence
of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, except that such
a claim need not be so stated if at the time the action was commenced the
claim was the subject of another pending action. (Emphasis added.)
(b) Permissive Counterclaims. A pleading may state as a counterclaim any claim
against an opposing party not arising out of the transaction or occurrence that
is the subject matter of opposing party's claim. (Emphasis added.)
9 Hancock Oil Co. v. Universal Oil Prod. Co., 115 F.2d 45 (9th Cir. 1940).
10 Supra note 6. James refers to Bendix Aviation Corp. v. Glass, 81 F. Supp. 645,
(E.D. Pa. 1948) where defendant filed a counterclaim for compensation against
plaintiff's action for specific performance of a contract. The court there said, at 646:
Under the old system of divided law and equity procedure a defendant in an
equity suit who had a cause of action at law against the plaintiff waived his
right to a jury trial if he pleaded it as a counterclaim against the plaintiff's
bill. However, Rule 13(a) now makes it compulsory for him to do so if his
claim arises out of the same transaction. Consequently there can be no ques-
tion of this defendant's having waived jury trial by putting in his claim as
a counterclaim to an equitable action.
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In Johnson v. Neel, the Colorado Supreme Court had appar-
ently left the door to the implications of compulsory counterclaims
slightly ajar when it said:
In basing the determination of this question on grounds of
equitable estoppel, we are not unmindful of our opinion in Tiger
Placers Co. v. Fisher, 98 Colo. 221, 54 P.2d 891, 892, in which
we recognized the rule that the original complaint filed in an
action fixes "the nature of the suit and by what arm of the court
it should be tried," and whether either party is entitled to a jury
trial even though the cross complaint of the defendant presented
issues properly triable to a jury. That case, and others therein cited,
was determined under the code of civil procedure. Whether or not
the result would be the same under the Rules of Civil Procedure
which contains a provision relating to compulsory counterclaims
(Rule 13 [a]), we do not determine."
Apparently, the door has now been slammed shut. The court dis-
poses of any impact Rule 13(a) may have on previous decisions by
holding that there are no material differences between the code and
Rule 13(a) on the subject of compulsory counterclaims. At least
not enough differences to justify abandonment of the rule on right to
jury trial announced in Neikirk v. Boulder National Bank. 2
The federal courts have consistently followed the United States
Supreme Court's lead in Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover3 and
hold that, since the promulgation of the provision for the merger
of legal and equitable actions," the filing of a counterclaim, or any
legal defense against an equitable claim does not constitute a waiver
of trial by jury on the legal questions. They hold that there are no
longer equity cases and legal cases. The legal issues, not the form
of the cases, are determinative of the method of trial. 6
Where before the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure the federal courts may have held that a court sitting in
equity could retain jurisdiction even with regard to legal issues raised
in an equitable action, the present courts would reject this principle.
Relying upon Federal Rules 1, 2, and 18, the federal courts hold
that the same court may try both legal and equitable causes in the
same action. 7 Following Beacon, they hold that legal and equitable
issues can be tried at the same time, with the jury (if demanded)
1 123 Colo. 377, 388, 229 P.2d 939, 945 (1951).
1253 Colo. 350, 127 Pac. 137 (1912).
13 359 U.S. 500'(1959).
14 COLO. R. Civ. P. 1 and FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
15 De Pinto v. Provident Security Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1963); Wirtz
v. Robert E. Bob Adair, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 750 (W.D. Ark. 1963) ; Bendix Aviation
Corp. v. Glass, 81 F. Supp. 645 (E.D. Pa. 1948).
16 Beaunit Mills, Inc. v. Eday Fabric Sales Corp., 124 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1942).
17 De Pinto v. Provident Security Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1963).
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rendering a verdict on the legal issues and the court rendering a deci-
sion on the equitable issues.18 The right to a jury trial on legal
issues, with a few exceptions not applicable here, will not be denied
to a defendant in federal court on the mere ground that the case
was originally presented to the court as an equitable action by the
plaintiff."9
Many states have followed the trend of the federal courts by
rejecting their previous holdings made under state codes prior to
the adoption of rules similar to the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure."0 The Colorado court was given an opportunity to follow
the trend but refused.
The right to jury trial in civil actions has triggered considerable
comment and many solutions have been proposed.2' One common
criticism of the procedure required by the Colorado court's decision
in Miller- separate trials of the equitable claim and legal counter-
claim if a jury trial is desired - is that a certain amount of evidence
may have to be repeated, therefore defeating one objective of the
merger provision of the rules: economy of litigation. In view of the
federal cases interpreting the federal rules, from which the Colorado
rules were promulgated, there appears to be no justifiable reason
for requiring the additional litigation.
B. ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF SUPREME COURT: PROHIBITION
In Colorado State Council of Carpenters v. District Court,22 the
court exercised its original jurisdiction under unique circumstances.
In an original proceeding by two labor unions and their presenta-
tives, entitled Original Proceedings Under Rule 106(4) and Rule
116 in Nature of Prohibition, the court issued an absolute rule
vacating a distrit court's order for a temporary injunction against
picketing. Lack of jurisdiction in the district court was the basis
for the rule.
Briefly, the proceeding arose from the following facts: Peti-
18 Ibid.; Damsky v. Zavatt, 289 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1961).
19Thermostitch, Inc. v. Chemi-Cord Processing Corp., 294 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1961).
2 0 E.g. California in Hutchason v. Marks, 54 Cal. App.2d 113, 128 P.2d 573 (1942),
and Minnesota, which had earlier case law to the effect that the decisive test whether
an action is triable to the court or to a jury was determined by the complaint. In
Landgraf v. Ellsworth, 126 N.W.2d 766 (Minn. 1964), the Minnesota court held
that the nature and character of the action was determined from all the pleadings and
the right to jury trial was also so determined. The court refused to follow the old
doctrine, but stated that the more recent cases, which it followed, represented the
correct view of the law.
21 James, supra note 6; McCoid, supra note 7; Pike & Fischer, Pleadings and Jury Rights
in the New Federal Procedure, 88 U. PA. L. REv. 645 (1940) ; 59 COLUM. L. REv.
938 (1959).
2 392 P.2d 601 (Colo. 1964).
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tioners requested that the employer, a construction company build-
ing a water reservoir for the City of Fort Collins, sign a bargaining
agreement. When the employer refused, the petitioners caused
pickets to be placed near the entrance to the work project. The
picketing caused complete work stoppage when union members
honored the line and refused to cross. The employer sought an
injunction against the picketing in district court. Petitioners filed
no responsive pleadings to raise any issue of fact but merely appeared
at a hearing on the injunction and orally suggested to the trial judge
that there was grave doubt concerning the court's jurisdiction in
view of the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act. The
employer presented testimony to prove his allegations, whereas the
petitioners offered no testimony whatsoever.
In briefs submitted by counsel to the supreme court, the peti-
tioners alleged that the evidence showed the employer was arguably
engaged in operations which affect commerce, thereby precluding
the district court's jurisdiction, and that the preliminary injunction
was a matter of great public importance because it deprived em-
ployees of their rights of self-organization, collective bargaining,
and concerted action. The employer, in a brief by his counsel, con-
tended that the employer's operation did not affect commerce and
that the petitioner had another adequate remedy: writ of error.
The majority of the court, in vacating the district court's order
for a temporary injunction, relied upon Building Construction Trades
Council v. American Builders, Inc.,' in which it was held that the
state courts have no jurisdiction to enjoin peaceful picketing in the
absence of a showing that the National Labor Relations Board has
declined to accept jurisdiction over the controversy. Two recent
United States Supreme Court decisions"4 also were subscribed to as
the basis for the court's decision.
The propriety of granting the extraordinary remedy of prohi-
bition seems to be questionable in this case. The general rule regard-
ing a writ of prohibition is that ordinarily it will not issue where
there is another legally adequate remedy, or where the jurisdiction
of the lower court is debatable, or depends on facts de hors the
record."5 Colorado generally subscribes to the concept that prohi-
23 139 Colo. 236, 337 P.2d 953 (1959).
24 Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96 (1963) ; Local 438, Construc-
tion Union v. Curry, 371 U.S. 542 (1963).
2542 AM. JUR. Prohibition § 5 (1942).
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bition is primarily a preventive or restraining remedy and is not a
corrective remedy which is the function of a writ of error.26
A showing that a court is proceeding without or in excess of
jurisdiction is not sufficient basis for granting a writ of prohibition;
either non-availability of any other adequate remedy, or irreparable
damage, or "matters of great public importance" must also be shown
before the writ is ordinarily granted.'
The court's decision here apparently was based solely upon the
lack of jurisdiction. Because there is no mention of questions con-
cerning the propriety for issuance of the rule, it is difficult to deter-
mine what factors other than lack of jurisdiction existed. Was the
preliminary injunction a matter of great public importance? Was
the ordinary remedy of writ of error inadequate in this situation?
Or is the court saying that, as a matter of policy, prohibition will
lie any time a state court exercises jurisdiction and issues an injunc-
tion against picketing of an operation which arguably affects com-
merce?
In an interesting and critical dissent, Hall, J. raises some inter-
esting points regarding the propriety of the original proceeding
and the court's review of the trial court proceeding. He candidly
states that the supreme court exceeded its jurisdiction by entertain-
ing the matter as an original proceeding. He argues that the
26 City of Aurora v. Congregation Beth Medrosh Hag., 140 Colo. 462, 345 P.2d 385
(1959); Leonhart v. District Court, 138 Colo. 1, 329 P.2d 781 (1958) where the
court said:
Corrective measures are not within the sweep and coverage of prohibition;
correction of error is the function of a writ of error. A trial court has the
power to render a right as well as a wrong decision. "Prohibition may never
be used to restrain a trial court having jurisdiction of the parties and of the
subject matter from proceeding to a final conclusion. Nor may it be used to
restrain a trial court from committing error in deciding a question properly
before it; it may not be used in lieu of a writ of error." (Citation omitted.)
138 Colo. at 6, 329 P.2d at 783.
See also People ex rel. Pratt v. District Court, 33 Colo. 306, 79 Pac. 1018 (1905);
Mclnerney v. City of Denver, 17 Colo. 302, 29 Pac. 516 (1892).
27 COLO. R. Civ. P. 116, "Relief in the nature of prohibition will not be granted except
in matters of great public importance. The fact that a court has erroneously granted
or denied change of venue, or is otherwise proceeding without or in excess of juris-
diction, will not be regarded as sufficient."; Stull v. District Court, 135 Colo. 86,
308 P.2d 1006 (1957) where it was stated:
It appears that there are two requirements in construing the quoted last sen-
tence of Rule 116, R.C.P., to-wit:
(1) That each case is determined by its own circumstances and conditions;
and
(2) That coupled with the claim of lack of jurisdiction or proceedings in
excess thereof, must be at least one other factor spelled out elsewhere in
our rules and decisions, such as that it is a matter of great public
importance, or that no plain, speedy or adequate remedy exists, or that
relief by way of writ of error will be futile. 135 Colo. at 93, 308 P.2d
at 1010.
Allen, Mandamus, Quo Warranto, Prohibition, and Ne Exeat, 1960 U. ILL. L.F. 102,
110.
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majority completely ignored the court's earlier pronouncements
concerning the issuance of prohibition.
As the dissenting judge points out, the majority does not men-
tion the question as to whether the employer's operations affect
commerce even though the employer's counsel urged that there was
no proof that the building of the reservoir affected commerce. Since
"affecting commerce" is essential to create jurisdiction in the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board and thereby preempt jurisdiction of
a state court, the supreme court side-stepped a very critical issue.
The cases cited for support of the decision are in a different cate-
gory. In all of them the operations involved either were stipulated
as affecting commerce or were directly involved in interstate com-
merce. Because of this factual issue, there is some question whether
the state district court lacked jurisdiction.
The supreme court apparently adopted a philosophy that a
state court must keep its hands off any action which might involve
the National Labor Relations Board. This might preclude future
hand slapping by a federal court, but the use of prohibition seems
to be stretching things a little too far. Prohibition is an extraordinary
remedy which should be, as expressed by the court on many prior
occasions, issued only upon sound and cautious discretion.2" The
exercise of discretion encompasses the existence or absence of other
adequate relief.' A writ of error was available to the petitioners.
With no record to review, the court, in effect, gave the petition-
ers the benefit of a writ of supersedeas, without incurring the liability
or expense of a bond, when it vacated the injunction."0
C. EXTENT OF INQUIRY INTO JUDGMENT WHEN BANKRUPTCY
RAISED As DEFENSE To EXECUTION THEREOF
A case arose concerning the extent of permissible inquiry into
a judgment subject to discharge in bankruptcy proceedings. Although
28 City of Aurora v. Congregation Beth Medrosh Hag., 140 Colo. 462, 345 P.2d 385
(1940); Leonhart v. District Court, 138 Colo. 1, 329 P.2d 781 (1958); People
ex rel. Benbow v. District Court, 37 Colo. 440, 86 Pac. 322 (1906) ; Mclnerny v.
City of Denver, 17 Colo. 302, 29 Pac. 516 (1892) ; Leonard v. Bartels, 4 Colo. 95
(1878).
29 City of Aurora v. Congregation Beth Medrosh Hag., supra note 28.
30 Cf. Local 1364 Retail Clerk's Union v. Superior Court, 52 Cal.2d 222, 339 P.2d 839,
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 864 (1959) where a writ of prohibition was sought under
similar circumstances. The court there said,
We are not prepared to hold that the allegations of bare conclusions of law as
to jurisdiction establish any facts as to the effect of any alleged labor practice
upon interstate commerce; rather, we agree with the superior court that in the
present state of the record there is an unresolved "factual question" (in addition
to questions of law) upon which determination of its jurisdiction may even-
tually depend. At the present time the allegations as to jurisdiction show at
most that upon further proceedings in the basic action questions of federal
preemption may be presented; but they show also that no such issue is ripe
for resolution in this proceeding. 339 P.2d at 841.
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there is no specific rule of civil procedure directly involved, the
case is apparently one of first impression in Colorado on the subject
and is worthy of some comment in this review.
In Miller v. Rush,3 a purchaser, plaintiff-in-error (hereafter
referred to as plaintiff), and seller, defendant-in-error (hereafter
referred to as defendant), entered into a written contract whereby
the defendant agreed to construct a residence and convey the same
to the plaintiff "free and clear" of all liens. In a foreclosure action
by lien claimants against both parties, plaintiff put up cash to cover
claims and obtained a cross-claim judgment against the defendant.
Judgment was partially satisfied and plaintiff filed motion for supple-
mentary proceedings under Rule 69, Colorado Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, seeking to make discovery of defendant's assets that might
be available for satisfaction of balance due. While proceeding
was pending, defendant filed a debtor petition in bankruptcy. Plain-
tiff filed a proof of claim reciting that the liability was based upon
defendant's obtaining money by false representation. Defendant
received a general discharge in bankruptcy. When plaintiff resumed
the supplementary proceedings, the trial court granted an indefinite
stay upon defendant's motion asserting defense of bankruptcy. Plain-
tiff contended that the trial court should conduct a hearing concern-
ing the true nature of his claim and find that the judgment was not
dischargeable because the liability was based upon fraud. The record
of judgment did not contain a single word concerning fraud or
misrepresentation. The trial court refused to consider anything out-
side the record of judgment and found it was discharged. Plaintiff
sought a writ of error overruling the trial court. The general rule
is that where the origin of the indebtedness is not apparent from the
judgment itself, "... it is proper to consider and review the whole
record of the proceedings in which the judgment was rendered,
including the pleadings, instructions to the jury, verdict, findings,
special interrogatories, and the answers thereto, and the enrolled
judgment order."32 While the majority of courts retrict their inquiry
to the record of proceedings,33 there seems to be a growing minority
which permits the introduction of testimony, not for the purpose of
attacking or opening the judgment, but to prove that the defense
of bankruptcy is not available to the debtor.'
31 393 P.2d 565 (Colo. 1964).
26 AM. JUR. Bankruptcy § 815 (1938).
33 National Finance Co. of Provo v. Daley, 14 Utah 2d 263, 382 P.2d 405 (1963);
Lawrence v. Wischnowsky, 344 111. App. 346, 100 N.E.2d 816 (1951); Shawano
Finance Corp. v. Haase, 252 Wis. 12, 30 N.W.2d 82 (1947).
34 Levin v. Singer, 227 Md. 47, 175 A.2d 423 (1961) ; Fidelity and Cas. Co. v. Golom-
bosky, 133 Conn. 317, 50 A.2d 817 (1946) ; Swig v. Tremont, 8 F.2d 943 (1st Cir.
1925) ; Gregory v. Williams. 106 Kan. 819, 189 Pac. 932 (1920).
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Both the majority and minority views seem to agree that an
inquiry into a judgment general in nature is proper to determine
whether the defense of bankruptcy is available. The primary dis-
agreement arises over the question of whether the inquiry is limited
to the record"5 or if the creditor may show that the defense of bank-
ruptcy is not available by testimony de hors the record. 6
The court sets forth the three points of view on the subject as:
(1). The judgment is conclusive and the court may not go
behind it to determine the facts on which predicated.
(2). Review of the whole record of the case may be had
to determine the real nature of the claim which has
been reduced to judgment.
(3). Not only review of the whole record may be had,
but the court may go outside thereof to determine
the nature of the claim (this is a decided minority
view).
In refusing to accept the minority view, (3) above, as urged
by the plaintiff, the court subscribed to a Utah decision, National
Finance Company of Provo v. Daley37 in which it was stated:
In our judgment, it better comports with the orderly processes of
justice to require the plaintiff to bear the responsibility of pleading,
proving, and claiming the full benefit of whatever character of cause
of action he possesses then to allow another trial upon the same
cause of action raising issues which could have been dealt with in
the original action.
The court pronounced that Colorado had in effect renounced
the minority view in Valdez v. Sams. 8 In that case, the plaintiff
alleged wilful negligence. The default judgment (entered when
defendant failed to answer) contained no findings other than simple
negligence and no exemplary damages were awarded. After judg-
ment was entered, defendant received a general discharge in bank-
ruptcy. Thereafter, when plaintiff began execution on the judg-
ment and commenced garnishment proceedings, the defendant
obtained a rule releasing the garnishee and prohibiting further writs
of garnishment. The supreme court, in holding that a judgment not
specifically setting forth findings making judgment non-discharge-
able therefore is dischargeable, stated:
Examination of the record in this action leads to the conclusion that
the trial court entered judgment based on simple negligence. If
plaintiffs desired to protect themselves against the possibility that
defendant might seek a discharge in bankruptcy, it was incumbent
35 See cases cited supra note 33 •
36 See cases cited supra note 34.
37 14 Utah 2d 263, 382 P.2d 405 (1963).
38 134 Colo. 488, 307 P.2d 189 (1957).
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on them to secure a specific finding in the trial court that the neg-
ligence of defendant was such that a discharge in bankruptcy it
was incumbent on them to secure a specific finding in the trial court
that the negligence of defendant was such that a discharge in bank-
ruptcy would not operate to release the judgment. No such finding
was made.3
9
The Colorado law still is not clear since the court did not
specifically state which of the other two views it followed. The
trial court expressly refused to go behind the judgment and examine
"the depositions, exhibits, pleadings, or other papers in the principal
action herein which preceded the judgment, because the same are
merged by the judgment." In affirming the trial court's action, the
court would appear to be adhering to view (1) above. However,
in Valdez, the court considered allegations in the complaint so
maybe view (2) above is followed. To preclude any problems, it
appears that a plaintiff should definitely obtain a specific finding
of non-dischargeable matters in the judgment.
D. COMPLAINT - NECESSITY FOR SPECIFIC ALLEGATION OF PLACE
WHERE TORT WAS COMMITTED
In Sprott v. Roberts,'° the court held that a complaint was
insufficient for failure to adequately allege the place where an
alleged tort was committed and a motion to dismiss on this basis
was good. The action was brought against an anestheseologist for
damages resulting from alleged malpractice. The complaint alleged
that the plaintiff had been taken by his mother to a dentist's office
for dental work and that the dentist engaged defendant to admin-
ister an anesthetic. Negligence of the two doctors in administering
the anesthetic was the alleged cause of damages. The trial court
granted defendant's motion to dismiss. The supreme court held that
the motion to dismiss was good on the basis of failure to allege the
place where the tort was committed, but reversed the trial court on
the ground that the plaintiff should have been allowed to amend his
complaint in accordance with Rule 15 (a).
The important aspect of the case is the court-imposed require-
ment that the place of the alleged tort must be alleged in particular.
This requirement seems to be contrary to the purpose of simplicity
of pleadings set forth in Rule 8(e)."' The federal courts have held
that the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "restrict the pleadings
to the task of general notice-giving.''2 Colorado has also held that
39Id. at 491.
40 390 P.2d 465 (Colo. 1964).
41 COLO. R. Civ. P. 8(e) (1), "Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise,
and direct. . . . No technical forms of pleading or motions are required."
42Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
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the chief function of a complaint is to give notice, and the test of
sufficiency is whether it gives fair notice to a defendant to enable him
to answer and prepare for trial." It seems like these requirements
are met in Sprott v. Roberts," but the court apparently ignored these
pronouncements. What makes it more confusing is the fact that in
J & K Const. Co. v. Malton, which was decided a little over a week
before Sprott, the court subscribed to the above test of sufficiency
and added that "the rule now is that pleadings are to be construed in
favor of the pleader." 46
Certainly, the defendant was sufficiently notified of the alleged
event and its location to enable him to answer and prepare for trial.
As pointed out by the dissent, this decision seems to be a step back-
wards towards the supertechnical requirements of common law
pleading.
E. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
In O'Herron v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 7 the
court followed federal court decisions in reversing a summary judg-
ment. An insurance company, third party defendant in a personal
injury action, admitted the issuance of policies to defendants but
denied coverage and by counterclaim for declaratory judgment
alleged that the policies did not cover defendants, third party plain-
tiff, because of specific provisions in the policies. The insurance
company took depositions from defendants and testimony contained
therein was in agreement with no dispute of the facts. The defend-
ants filed affidavits in opposition to the insurance company's motion
for summary judgment. The affidavits made qualifying statements,
in the form of conclusions, regarding the issue of whether the car
involved in the accident was being used for business or personal
purposes. The parties relied upon different provisions of the policies
as grounds for their position. The trial court entered a summary
judgment in favor of the insurance company on the basis of factual
issue in the depositions.
The supreme court reversed the lower court, finding that even
though there was no dispute in the depositional testimony, the
parties' "discordant contentions bringing about dissimilar results,
arise from divergent views of the testimony contained in the deposi-
tions." The court found that divergent inferences could be drawn
43J & K Const. Co. v. Molton, 390 P.2d 68 (Colo. 1964); Bridges v. Ingram, 122
Colo. 501, 223 P.2d 1051 '(1950).
390 P.2d 465 (Colo. 1964).
4
5 390 P.2d 68 (Colo. 1964).
46id. at 71.
47 397 P.2d 277 (Colo. 1964).
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from the facts, and these inferences would lead to variant results
depending upon which were more reasonable.
In support of its position that there was an issue of fact arising
from the inferences, the court, Frantz, J., cited federal court deci-
sions48 and stated:
That pleadings, depositions, admissions or affidavits contained
undisputed matter and can be taken as true is not decisive of the
question of whether there is a genuine issue of any material fact.
"An issue of fact may arise from countervailing inferences which
are permissible from evidence accepted as true.
'49
Following the Colorado rule that the part), moving for a sum-
mary judgment, in order to prevail, has the burden of showing the
clear absence of any genuine issue of fact,5" the court found that the
inferences drawn from the depositions precluded such a showing
and held that the motion for summary judgment should have been
denied.
In view of the effect of a summary judgment upon a party
against whom the motion is filed, this decision seems to be a just
approach. A literal construction of the bare depositions would have
precluded the third party plaintiff from a trial on an apparently
genuine issue of fact. The more liberal rule, followed by the court
here, allows litigation of a dispute even though the depositions did
not expressly manifest the dispute.*
Glenn A. Buse
*[Editor's Note: The Colorado Supreme Court decided another
significant case on civil procedure during 1964, Clemens v. District
Court, 390 P.2d 83. A comment on this case will be contained in
the next issue of the Denver Law Journal.]
48 Empire Electronic Co. v. United States, 311 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1962) ; Cameron v.
Vancouver Plywood Corp., 266 F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1959).
49 O'Herron v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 397 P.2d 227, 230-31 (1964).
5Koon v. Steffes, 124 Colo. 531, 239 P.2d 310 (1951).
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